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Abstract
A general framework for analyzing finite games will be introduced. The concept of an
incentive function will be defined so that it is compatible with the updating protocol defined
in Nash’s proof of existence of equilibrium in all finite games. A general notion of incentive
equilibrium will be defined as the fixed points of the updating protocol. It will be shown that
given a continuous incentive, an incentive equilibrium will exist for any finite game. Specific
examples will be given that have connections to canonical game dynamics and the incentive
equilibrium are described fully. Non canonical examples will also be defined including an
example based on simultaneous updating of strategies by the agents.
A system of differential equations will be derived from the updating protocol, which have
fixed points exactly at incentive equilibrium. It will be shown that the canonical dynamics
can be achieved using the canonical incentives. Specifically the Brown-von Neumann-Nash
dynamics, replicator equations, projection dynamics, logit equations, best-reply dynamics,
and pairwise comparison dynamics will all be derived from their respective incentives. It
will be shown that the incentive dynamics are fully general in the sense that it can be used
to describe all possible game dynamics that preserve the strategy space.
Incentive stable states, ISS, for general incentive dynamics will be defined as an ana-
log to the concept of the evolutionary stable states, ESS, in the replicator dynamics. The
connection between the replicator dynamics and information theory is discussed. Of partic-
ular interest is the use of the Kullback-Leibler divergence as a Lyapunov function to show
that an ESS is asymptotically stable for the replicator dynamics. It will be shown that the
Kullback-Liebler divergence is also a Lyapunov function for the incentive dynamics at ISS.
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An important example of ISS is given by realizing the uniform distribution as an interior
ISS for an incentive based on simultaneous updating in a class of games that includes all
variations of Rock-Paper-Scissors, RPS. The uniform distribution is the unique incentive
(Nash) equilibrium for all of the canonical dynamics. However, for a specific choice of
parameters in RPS if an orbit has an initial condition that is not the uniform distribution
it will not converge to the unique fixed point in any of the canonical dynamics. In stark
contrast, the ISS condition guarantees the uniform distribution is asymptotically stable for
simultaneous updating. It will be shown that it is in fact globally asymptotically stable for
the interior of the strategy space.
A collection of numerical results will be given for a particular incentive. It will be shown
in a number of distinct games that the incentive equilibrium is a better approximation to
human behavior than the Nash equilibrium. This collection of games includes the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, Matching Pennies, Battle of the Sexes, the Traveler’s Dilemma, Chicken, and other
unnamed games of interest. Several different variations on each one of these games will be
given to demonstrate the dependence on absolute differences in payoffs inherent in this model
of incentive. This feature, known as cardinal dependence, is exhibited by human actors but
is missing from the Nash model, which is preference, or ordinal, dependent. It will also be
shown that under this incentive agents display a competitive nature as evidenced by certain
games with ‘win-win’ strategies having alternative equilibrium that are asymptotically stable.
Specifically this behavior seems to appear when one agent has more opportunities to attain
its maximum payoff than the other agents. This is also an observable behavior of human
actors which is absent from the Nash model.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
I can calculate the motions of erratic bodies, but not the madness of a multi-
tude. [Fra] - Sir Issac Newton
These are famous words of lament from one of our greatest geniuses after he lost a fortune
investing in the South Sea Bubble of 1720. This and innumerable other phenomenon in
economics and social behavior provide us with the impetus for developing a theory of social
decision making. After all, if the father of classical mechanics can fall prey to what in modern
terms we might refer to as ‘irrational exuberance’ [Gre96], what hope is there without some
precise notion of how we as humans act or perhaps more importantly how we do act? We
will now discuss some of the early results of game theory and conclude with an outline for
a general framework for games and behavior.
1.1 The Minimax Theorem
As far as I can see, there could be no theory of games . . . without that theorem
. . . I thought there was nothing worth publishing until the Minimax Theorem
was proved - John von Neumann [VNF53]
von Neumann and Morgenstern created the foundation for the modern concept of equi-
librium in games in the classic book “The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior”
[vNMRK07]. They sought to find a solution concept for zero sum games, as these form
an important class of games in economics. The minimax strategy of von Neumann [vN28]
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satisfied all of their axioms of rational behavior in agents. These strategies have the charac-
teristic that the utility or payoff to the agent is as large as possible while assuming the least
amount of risk. For zero sum games this reduces to minimizing one’s own maximum payoff.
Unfortunately, the minimax concept is only defined for two person games. To account
for this, von Neumann assumed that agents would form coalitions against each other and in
this sense the problem would reduce to a two coalition game to which the minimax solution
applied.
1.2 The Nash Equilibrium
Nash sought to generalize the notion of a minimax solution and to show that a solution
exists for any finite game, zero-sum or not, without the need for cooperation. In his seminal
papers [Nas50, Nas51] he defined, quite elegantly, a solution concept for all n-person finite
games that would eventually earn him the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. The
concept generalized the work of von Neumann by defining an equilibrium point to be a
collection of strategies where every agent is attaining its maximum payoff given that all the
other agents hold their strategy fixed. He then very cleverly applied fixed point theorems of
Kakutani [Kak41] and Brouwer respectively.
Since its inception, the Nash equilibrium has been used in many fields including but not
limited to; economics, computer science, political science, psychology, and biology. In many
of these fields the solution seems to be a reasonable approximation to the observable behavior.
This is especially true in instances where humans are not the actors in the game. This is
disconcerting as game theory was primarily developed to understand problems in economics,
where human agents abound. There are decades worth of data describing this unfortunate
phenomenon, see [Bas07, CCG07, Bas94, RC65, GR72] for examples, leaving game theorists,
economists and the like, to wonder what humans actually use to make decisions.
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1.3 Evolutionary Game Theory
Evolutionary game theory as developed in [TJ78, HS88, Wei97, HS98, Cre03, Now06, San10]
is the study of evolutionary processes on a population. These evolutionary processes, natural
selection for instance, are modeled by systems of differential equations, where an orbit of
the equation can be thought of as the evolution of a population. These are games in that
the fitness of a type within a population is dependent on the frequency of other types in
the population. The types are directly analogous to the agents in classic game theory, while
the frequencies of these types are essentially the strategies, and fitness is utility. The main
difference between classic and evolutionary games is the population effectively plays the
game against itself. Because of this, games are generally symmetric.
Perhaps the most important concept in evolutionary game theory is that of the evolution-
ary stable strategies (ESS) which was introduced by Maynard Smith and G R Price [S+74,
MSP73]. A population is at an ESS if it cannot be invaded by a sufficiently small mutant
population. It has been shown [HS98, Har11] in a number of ways that ESS are asymptoti-
cally stable for the replicator equations [TJ78], which are by far the most widely recognized
equations in evolutionary game theory. While these concepts have been widely adapted to
problems with human actors, they still rely heavily on the Nash equilibrium1 and are thus
prone to the same inaccuracies. To make matters slightly worse it can also be shown that
there are instances when the dynamics do not converge to unique equilibrium points.
1.4 Outline of Mathematical Framework
We will begin the process of defining a general framework for analyzing finite games with the
concept of an incentive function. Essentially incentive functions will measure the amount an
agent would prefer to play a pure strategy versus the current strategy. We will define them
such that it is compatible with the updating protocol defined in Nash’s proof of existence
1All ESS are Nash equilibrium.
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of equilibrium in all finite games [Nas51]. From these incentive functions and the updating
protocol we will define a general concept of incentive equilibrium. These will effectively be
defined as the fixed points of the updating protocol and are generalizations of the Nash
equilibrium. It will be shown that given a continuous incentive an incentive equilibrium will
exist for any finite game. Specific examples will be given that have connections to canonical
game dynamics and their incentive equilibria will be described fully. Non canonical examples
will also be defined including an example based on simultaneous updating of strategies by
the agents. This incentive function will be analyzed throughout this dissertation as it seems
to give solutions that are reasonable approximations to human behavior.
From the updating protocol, a system of differential equations will be derived, which
have fixed points exactly at incentive equilibrium. It will be shown that from the canonical
incentives, the canonical dynamics can be achieved. Specifically the Brown-von Neumann-
Nash dynamics [BvN50], replicator equations [TJ78], projection dynamics [SDL08], logit
equations [FL98], best-reply dynamics [GM91], and pairwise comparison dynamics [Smi84]
will all be derived from their respective incentives. It will be shown that the incentive
dynamics are fully general in the sense that it can be used to describe all possible game
dynamics that preserve the strategy space.
Incentive stable states, ISS, for general incentive dynamics will be defined as an analog
to the concept of the evolutionary stable states, ESS, in the replicator dynamics. The con-
nection between the replicator dynamics and information theory is discussed. Of particular
interest is the use of the Kullback-Leibler divergence [KL51] as a Lyapunov function to show
that an ESS is asymptotically stable for the replicator dynamics. It will be shown that the
Kullback-Liebler divergence is also a Lyapunov function for the incentive dynamics at ISS.
An important example of ISS is given by realizing the uniform distribution as an interior
ISS for an incentive based on simultaneous updating in a class of games that includes all
variations of Rock-Paper-Scissors, RPS. The uniform distribution is the unique incentive
(Nash) equilibrium for all of the canonical dynamics. However, for a specific choice of
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parameters in RPS, all of the canonical dynamics exhibit the same behavior: if an orbit has
an initial condition that is not the uniform distribution it will not converge to the unique
fixed point. Instead they are have a stable limit cycle which is close to what is referred to
as the Shapley2 triangle. In stark contrast, the ISS condition for our dynamic guarantees
the uniform distribution is asymptotically stable. It will be shown that it is in fact globally
asymptotically stable for the interior of the strategy space.
A collection of numerical results will be given for our simultaneous updating incentive.
It will be shown in a number of distinct games that the incentive equilibria are a better ap-
proximation to human behavior than the Nash equilibria. This collection of games includes
the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Matching Pennies, Battle of the Sexes, the Traveler’s Dilemma,
Chicken, and other unnamed games of interest. Several different variations on each one of
these games will be given to demonstrate the dependence on absolute differences in payoffs
inherent in this model of incentive. This feature, known as cardinal dependence, is exhibited
by human actors but is missing from the Nash model, which exhibits ordinal dependence.
It will also be shown that under this incentive agents display a competitive nature as ev-
idenced by certain games with ‘win-win’ strategies having alternative equilibrium that are
asymptotically stable. Specifically this behavior seems to appear when one agent has more
opportunities to attain its maximum payoff than the other agents. This is also an observable
behavior of human actors which is absent from the Nash model.
1.4.1 Notation and Definitions
We shall denote the finite set of agents by N = {1, 2, . . . , n} for some n ∈ N. Each agent i is
endowed with a finite set of pure strategies, which will be denoted Si = {1, 2, . . . , si}, with
si ∈ N as well. To allow the agents to mix their strategies, they may choose strategies from
2named in honor of Lloyd Stowell Shapley
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the simplex on si vertices,
∆i =
{
xi ∈ Rsi
∣∣∣∣∣xiα ≥ 0,∑
α
xiα = 1
}
,
which is the convex hull of Si, or equivalently the space of probability distributions over the
finite set. For simplicity we will embed Si in ∆i such that α ∈ Si 7→ eiα ∈ Rsi where eik is
the kth standard unit vector in the Euclidean space Rsi . We denote S = ×iSi and ∆ = ×i∆i
as the pure and mixed strategy spaces respectively for the game.
It is often convenient to denote the pure and mixed strategy spaces without a particular
player; S−i, and ∆−i respectively. We define S−i = ×j 6=iSj, and ∆−i = ×j 6=i∆j. Elements
in these sets can be interpreted many different ways. In particular S−i is a s−i =
|S|
si
dimensional space and we would prefer to identify elements in this space with standard
unit vectors in Rs−i as before. Unfortunately, there are s−i! ways to accomplish this. In
practice, we will only use this identification when we will sum over all possible combinations
of pure strategies. Using a different identification will simply result in a permutation of
terms in a finite sum, which of course has no effect. k ∈ S−i is a multi-index given by
(k1, . . . , ki−1, ki+1, . . . , kn). Our embedding, given by k ∈ S−i 7→ e−iβ ∈ Rs−i , extends to ∆−i
such that x−i ∈ ∆−i =
∑
β x−iβe−iβ with x−iβ =
∏
j 6=i xjkj . If we have a single agent we will
interpret S−i, ∆−i, s−i, and x−i as S, ∆, s and x respectively.
We will also adopt a convention for replacement for part of a strategy profile, x ∈ ∆. We
write (ti, x−i) ∈ ∆ = (x1, x2, . . . , ti, . . . , xn), where the ith component of x has been replaced
by another strategy ti ∈ ∆i.
Each agent will have a utility function defined over the set of all possible combinations
of pure strategies S. We will denote this utility
ui : S → R.
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These utility functions have unique n-linear extensions to ∆ given by
ui(x) =
∑
α
xiαui(eiα, x−i) = xTi Aix−i,
where aiαβ = ui(eiα, e−iβ) and Ai = {aiαβ}. We will simply refer to these extensions as the
utility functions from now on.
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Chapter 2
A General Framework for Equilibrium
in Finite Games
The Nash equilibrium [Nas50] is ubiquitous throughout game theory. The rise of evolu-
tionary game theory has put new emphasis on dynamics of rationality as opposed to static
equilibrium concepts. Most of these dynamic models are focused on either the Nash equi-
librium itself or some refinement of the Nash equilibrium, eg. evolutionary stable strategies
(ESS) [S+74], -equilibrium [Eve57], etc. However, the question of applicability of the Nash
equilibrium to actual human actors is still open. Often, in practice, the Nash equilibrium
does not approximate actual behavior in a given game; see Prisoner’s Dilemma [RC65] or
Traveler’s Dilemma [Bas94, Bas07] for instance.
We open up the interpretation of an equilibrium by first generalizing the notion of incen-
tive for an agent. In the sequel we will derive from this interpretation a family of differential
equations that can account for different updating procedures used by agents. First however,
we will show there exists equilibrium in games with general incentives requiring minimal
conditions.
2.1 Incentive Equilibrium
We begin the treatment of general equilibrium by starting with Nash’s second proof of
existence in finite games [Nas51].
Definition 2.1. A strategy profile x ∈ ∆ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
ui(x) = max
t∈∆i
ui(t, x−i), ∀i.
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We may simplify this definition by further linearly extending the utility functions to all
of Rm, where m =
∏
i si. This results in m-linear functions which are harmonic on all of Rm.
We may therefore invoke the maximum principle on the closed convex space ∆ recursively
to deduce that the ui’s are maximized (and minimized) in S. Therefore,
max
t∈∆i
ui(t, x−i) = max
α
ui(eα, x−i),
and thus we can give an equivalent definition for the Nash equilibrium as follows:
Definition 2.2. A strategy profile x ∈ ∆ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
ui(x) = max
α
ui(eα, x−i), ∀i.
Thus it was natural for Nash to define a class of continuous incentive functions by
ϕNashiα (x) = (ui(eα, x−i)− ui(x))+
where
(x)+ = max(0, x).
It is at this point where we are ready to define the updating protocol by which agents will
discreetly change their strategies. We define the map
T (x) : ×iRsi → ×iRsi
where
T (x)i =
xi +
∑
α ϕiα(x)eα
1 +
∑
β ϕiβ(x)
.
It is easily verified that the sum of the coefficients of T (x)i is 1 if xi ∈ ∆i, however, if xiα = 0
we must have ϕiα(x) ≥ 0 in order to preserve the simplex. We also require
∑
β ϕiβ(x) 6= −1
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for any x ∈ ×iRsi . This leads us to our definition of generalized incentive.
Definition 2.3. A function ϕ(x) : ×iRsi → ×iRsi is an incentive function if and only if it
satisfies both of the following conditions for all players i:
1. xiα = 0⇒ ϕiα(x) ≥ 0, ∀α
2.
∑
β ϕiβ(x) 6= −1 for any x ∈ ×iRsi .
If we have a function defined as above we may simply refer to it as the incentive for the
game.
To complement our definition of incentive we must redefine equilibrium for the game to
account for the general incentive. First, we will produce conditions for the mapping T (x) to
have a fixed point.
0 = T (x)i − xi, ∀i (2.1)
=
xi +
∑
α ϕiα(x)eα
1 +
∑
β ϕiβ(x)
− xi (2.2)
=
∑
α ϕiα(x)eα − xi
∑
β ϕiβ(x)
1 +
∑
β ϕiβ(x)
(2.3)
⇔
∑
α
ϕiα(x)eα = xi
∑
β
ϕiβ(x) (2.4)
⇔ ϕiα(x) = xiα
∑
β
ϕiβ(x), ∀i, α (2.5)
Note that at a fixed point, 2.4 says that ϕi is parallel to xi. Furthermore, ϕiα(x)/xiα equals
the total incentive provided that xiα 6= 0. If ϕiα(x) = 0 at a fixed point then either xiα = 0
or
∑
β ϕiβ(x) = 0, but xiα = 0 ⇒ ϕiα(x) = 0. It is convenient then to abuse notation and
write
ϕi(x)
xi
=
(
ϕi1(x)
xi1
, . . . ,
ϕisi(x)
xisi
)
with the convention that ϕiα(x) = 0⇒ ϕiα(x)
xiα
= 0.
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Definition 2.4. A strategy profile xˆ is an incentive equilibrium if and only if
xˆi · ϕi(xˆ)
xˆi
= max
xi∈∆i
xi · ϕi(xˆ)
xˆi
, ∀i.
Note that if we maximize the right hand side of the equation with respect to xi under
the simplex constraint we must have ϕiα(xˆ)/xˆiα all equal. The left hand side is clearly∑
β ϕiβ(xˆ). Therefore, T (xˆ) = xˆ⇔ xˆ is an incentive equilibrium. An intuitive description of
the concept is that agents will achieve equilibrium if they either have no incentive or their
incentives are in line with their current strategy for the game.
The following lemma will be very useful for proving not only our main theorem that an
incentive equilibrium exists in every finite game, but will also allow us to identify equilibrium
points in games that have certain symmetries.
Lemma 2.1. If the incentive is continuous, a fixed point exists for T in any closed convex
U ⊂ ×iRsi that is left invariant by T .
Proof. Given the assumptions, T maps from U to U continuously and thus Brouwer’s fixed
point theorem guarantees the existence of a fixed point for T in U .
We now have all the tools necessary to prove the main theorem.
Theorem 2.2. If the incentive is continuous, an incentive equilibrium point xˆ exists for any
finite game.
Proof. We have defined the incentive functions such that the updating protocol T (x) defined
above is a continuous map from ∆ to ∆ and thus by our lemma, there exits an xˆ ∈ ∆ such
that T (xˆ) = xˆ. T (xˆ) = xˆ⇔ xˆ is an incentive equilibrium.
Other consequences of our lemma can also be obtained quite simply. For example, sup-
pose a two player game has the property that the incentive is continuous and ϕ1(x) = ϕ2(x)
for every x ∈ ∆ such that x1 = x2. The closed convex subset U = {x ∈ ∆|x1 = x2} is left
11
invariant by T and thus an incentive equilibrium point exists in U . We can generalize this
to symmetric n-player games. Denote the symmetric group on a finite set X as Sym(X).
Proposition 2.3. Suppose all players have the same pure strategy space, S1. Let U = {x ∈
∆|x1α = xiσi(α), for some σi ∈ Sym(S1)}. If ϕ(x) is continuous and ϕ1α(x) = ϕiσi(α)(x) for
every x ∈ U , then an incentive equilibrium exists in U .
Proof. U is closed and convex and left invariant by T , thus our lemma guarantees the
existence of a fixed point of T in U which is a subset of ∆. Thus the fixed point is an
incentive equilibrium.
2.2 Examples
We will now discuss some specific examples of incentives.
2.2.1 Canonical Examples
We will refer to a collection of incentives that have been well studied in other venues. They
are all very closely related to the Nash equilibrium. In fact they all share the property that
an interior Nash equilibrium is an incentive equilibrium.
Nash Incentive
Above it was noted that Nash defined a family of functions as
ϕNashiα (x) = (ui(eα, x−i)− ui(x))+
for every player i and every strategy α ∈ Si. ϕNash(x) is trivially an incentive function as it
is non-negative in every component at every x ∈ ∆. Clearly this incentive is continuous as
f(x) = (x)+ and ui(x) are both continuous. Thus an incentive equilibrium exists for every
finite game.
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We expect that the incentive equilibrium must in fact be a Nash equilibrium. If xˆ is a
Nash equilibrium, ϕ(xˆ) = 0 and thus every Nash equilibrium is an incentive equilibrium.
Conversely, if xˆ is an incentive equilibrium we have several possibilities. If
∑
β ϕ
Nash
iβ (xˆ) = 0,
xˆ is a Nash equilibrium. It suffices then to consider the case when the sum is positive. Also
we need not consider the case when xˆiα = 0 as this occurs if and only if ϕ
Nash
iα (xˆ) = 0.
Thus we can assume xˆiα > 0. This can occur in an incentive equilibrium if and only if
ϕNashiα (xˆ) > 0, which implies ui(eα, xˆi) > ui(xˆ) for any α such that xˆiα > 0. For these α the
inequality, xˆiαui(eα, xˆi) > xˆiαui(xˆ), must also hold. If we sum over these α we obtain the
impossible condition, ui(xˆ) > ui(xˆ). Thus at equilibrium ϕ
Nash(xˆ) = 0, which implies xˆ is a
Nash equilibrium.
Replicator Incentive
Interestingly, the replicator dynamics [TJ78], specifically the n-population models, given
by x˙iα = xiα(ui(eα, x−i) − ui(x)), provide incentive functions as well. Define ϕRiα(x) =
xiα(ui(eα, x−i)− ui(x)). ϕR(x) is an incentive function since
∑
β ϕ
R
iβ(x) = 0 and xiα = 0⇒
ϕRiβ(x) = 0. The replicator incentive function is not just continuous but analytic and thus
easily satisfies the condition for existence of incentive equilibrium.
The classification of these equilibrium points are quite easy given the total incentive
is identically zero. We must have all ϕRiα(xˆ) = 0 if xˆ is an incentive equilibrium. These
functions are zero in three cases; xˆiα = 0, xˆiα = 1, and ui(eα, xˆ−i) = ui(xˆ). Thus in the
interior of ∆ our equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium. In fact given the last condition all Nash
equilibria are replicator incentive equilibria. Finally, the first two conditions tell us that all
x ∈ S are equilibria in contrast to the Nash incentive.
We can actually use many different incentive functions to get the same behavior. The
simplest of these is ϕRiα(x) = xiαui(eα, x−i). Notice that the total incentive
∑
β ϕ
R
iα(x) = ui(x)
for every x ∈ ∆, which could violate the second condition for an incentive function if the
utility for any player is ever −1. However, we can translate our payoffs by arbitrary functions
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gi(x) in every component for each player i. Thus ϕ
R
iα(x) = xiα(ui(eα, x−i) + gi(x)) and∑
α ϕ
R
iα(x) = ui(x) + gi(x). Furthermore, our equilibrium condition remains unchanged as
xiα(ui(eα, x−i)+gi(x)) = xiα(ui(x)+gi(x)) is satisfied if xiα is 0 or 1, or if ui(eα, x−i) = ui(x).
Thus in any finite game we can translate payoffs without changing equilibrium and every
finite game has a translated version where our function is a valid incentive. In only slight
contrast to the previous case the equilibria occurs when ϕRiα(xˆ) 6= 0. In general we can use
ϕRiα(x) = xiα(ui(eα, x−i) + gi(x)) as our incentive function as long as g(x) translates each of
the minimum payoffs to any value greater than −1 (or maximum payoffs to values less than
−1).
Projection Incentive
The projection dynamic, originally introduced by Nagurney and Zhang[NZ96] and presented
in the style of Lahkar and Sandholm [LS08], is given by
x˙i = Fi(x),
where
Fi(x) =

(Ax)i − 1|S(Ax,x)|
∑
j∈S(Ax,x)(Ax)j if i ∈ S(Ax, x)
0 otherwise,
for a single population. S(Ax, x) is the set of all strategies in the support of x as well as any
collection of strategies that maximize the average presented in the first case above. Fi(x) is
clearly an incentive function for the game as
∑
i Fi(x) = 0 for every x ∈ ∆. When xi = 0,
i 6∈ supp(x) so Fi(x) = 0 or (Ax)i is part of a set that maximizes the average. In the second
case (Ax)i itself must be maximal and thus Fi(x) = 0.
It is shown in Sandholm, Dokumaci, and Lahkar [SDL08] that the replicator dynamics
and the projection dynamics share many features. Most important in this discussion are
the interior equilibria, which they showed to be Nash equilibria just as is the case for the
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replicator incentive. However, in this case the discontinuity at the boundary means the main
theorem does not apply.
Best Reply
The best reply incentive is quite easy to understand. It was originally introduced by Gilboa
and Matsui [GM91]. Nash defined a function B(x) in his original proof of existence, which
is a set valued function that returns all of the pure strategy best replies to the strategy x.
For our purposes we will use the function used by Young [You01], where
BRiα(x) =

1 if eiα ∈ B(x)
0 otherwise.
To make this a function, there is a tiebreaker assumed so that only one pure strategy
is taken to be the best reply. This function is a valid incentive since BRiα(x) ≥ 0 and∑
αBRiα(x) = 1 for every x ∈ ∆. The main theorem does not apply directly, however
the incentive equilibria for this are exactly Nash equilibria. Thus the existence of a Nash
equilibrium in all finite games guarantees the existence of an incentive equilibrium for the
best reply incentive.
Logit Incentive
The logit incentive was originally introduced as a smoothed version of best reply by Fuden-
berg and Levine [FL98]. The incentive is defined as
ϕLiα(x) =
exp(η−1u(eiα, x−i))∑
β exp(η
−1u(eiβ, x−i))
and is obviously a valid incentive function since ϕLiα(x) > 0 for every x and
∑
β ϕ
L
iβ(x) = 1.
The incentive is continuous and thus the main theorem applies. The incentive equilibria are
exactly the fixed points of ϕL(x).
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It should be noted that as η → 0 the incentive converges to the best reply incentive. On
the other end of the spectrum as η → ∞ this incentive approaches the zero incentive (see
below). The variable η is thought of as ‘noise’, and is essentially a measure of error in logic,
much like the  in the -equilibrium (see below).
Smith Incentive
The Smith incentive was developed by Micheal J. Smith [Smi84] to describe traffic flows. He
suggests as a reasonable assumption that the rate which drivers swap from one route, β, to
another route, α, is given by the proportion of drivers on route β times any additional cost
of using β over α. Thus we can interpret this as an incentive to switch to α as
ϕSiα(x) =
∑
γ
xiγ(ui(eiγ, x−i)− ui(eiα, x−i))+
where Smith would drop the i as there is only a single population of drivers.
The above function is always non-negative and thus is a valid incentive function. It is
also obviously continuous thus the main theorem applies. Any Nash equilibrium, x, is an
incentive equilibrium as xiα > 0⇔ ui(eiα, x−i) = maxγui(eiγ, x−i) and thus the terms in the
above sum are all zero. The converse however is not generally true. The set of incentive
equilibria in this case is called Wardrop equilibria [War52].
2.2.2 Other Examples
We can also describe a number of non-canonical examples which may be of interest.
The Zero Incentive
The trivial, or zero, incentive is given by ϕ(x) = 0 for all x ∈ ∆. The function is clearly
a valid incentive and also trivially satisfies the conditions for the existence of an incentive
equilibrium. This of course is not surprising as the zero incentive fixes every point in ∆, and
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thus all points are incentive equilibria. If only one agent uses the zero incentive to update,
it would appear to the opposition that the agent is choosing at random. In fact all elements
of ∆i are equally likely under this incentive.
-Nash Incentive
-Nash equilibria was first introduced by Everett [Eve57].
Definition 2.5. For a fixed  > 0, x ∈ ∆ is an -equilibrium if and only if
ui(x) ≥ ui(ti, x−i)−  ∀ti ∈ ∆i, i.
We can make a similar simplification to what we did for the Nash equilibrium. Instead
of checking every xi ∈ ∆i it suffices to check only those strategies in Si. We can therefore
use the incentive function
ϕiα(x) = (ui(eiα, x−i)− ui(x)− )+.
This is clearly an incentive as it is always non-negative. It is also continuous which ensures
the existence of incentive equilibrium. Of course, we already know that a Nash equilibrium
exists in all finite games and a Nash equilibrium is an -equilibrium for every  > 0.
There are simple examples of games that are repeated indefinitely which do not have
Nash equilibria, but do still have -equilibria for some  > 0. While this is beyond the
scope of this discussion it is worth mentioning. Within our scope are the finitely repeated
prisoner’s dilemmas. In these games it can be shown that the strategies tit-for-tat [AH81]
and grim trigger are -equilibria for some positive  which depends on the payoffs of the one
shot games.
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Simultaneous Updating
While the notion of the -equilibrium is very useful, it adds a degree of freedom to the
problem of finding equilibria.  would have to be fit to data in order to make the model
viable and must be changed for each new game.
We draw inspiration for a new model from Brams’ “Theory of Moves” [Bra94]. In his book
he describes a solution concept for 2× 2 games that is based on a hypothetical negotiation.
It is assumed that the agents begin this negotiation at a point in S, then each player does a
hypothetical check on what would happen if they moved to their alternative pure strategy.
They assume the other player will also switch and this alternating changing of strategy
continues until a cycle is complete1. Then the agent, using backward induction on the cycle,
decides whether or not to make the first move. The solutions are the collection of possible
outcomes given the 4 possible starting positions, giving this the feel of a discrete dynamical
system.
We define an incentive function that takes into account the other players’ possible reac-
tions to an agent’s move. We notice that if all agents are updating simultaneously then we
can be anywhere in ∆. Recall that all of the utility functions are maximized (and minimized)
in S, so we will only make comparisons on the boundary. Our incentive is defined as
ϕDiα(x) =
∑
γ
(aiαγ − ui(x))+ (2.6)
=
∑
γ
(ui(eiα, x−i)− ui(x) + aiαγ − ui(eiα, x−i))+. (2.7)
The function is a valid incentive since it is always non-negative, and is continuous which
means an incentive equilibrium exists for all finite games. Further analysis of this incentive,
including numerical results, will appear in the sequels. The incentive equilibria for ϕD(x)
that lie in S are very easily classified: they must be win-win situations in the sense that all
1This procedure always takes four moves, as the last move by the opposition returns the negotiation to
its original state
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players are achieving their maximum payoffs in the game.
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Chapter 3
Incentive Dynamics
The emergence of the replicator equations of Taylor and Jonker [TJ78] has created a renewed
interest in dynamic models of rational decision making. There are several examples of
these sorts of models including, but not limited to, the logit equation [FL98], best reply
dynamics [GM91], the Brown-von Neumann-Nash (BNN) equations [BvN50], projection
dynamics [NZ96, SDL08], Smith dynamics [Smi84], and others. Sandholm [San10] derives a
family of differential equations, referred to as mean dynamics, given by
x˙i =
∑
j∈S
xjρji(u(x), x)− xi
∑
j∈S
ρij(u(x), x)
to describe the inflow and outflow of agents to and from a type i within a single population.
The ρij are supposed to represent the conditional switch rate of an agent switching from
type i to type j. If one were to specify this probability appropriately then one can recover
all of the canonical dynamics listed above.
We seek a similarly flexible model but with incentive as the governing concept. We
will proceed in such a way as to derive the BNN equations as introduced by Brown and
von Neumann. As we have seen we can describe general equilibrium in games by way of
incentive functions. We then allow agents to update their strategies via a revision protocol,
T (x) given by
Ti(x) =
xi +
∑
α ϕiα(x)eiα
1 +
∑
β ϕiβ(x)
.
If we repeat this mapping we can think of it as a discrete time dynamical system defined
recursively by xt = T (xt−1), where the superscript here is to denote the time step and not
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an exponent.
3.1 Incentive Dynamics
Instead of working with the discrete time system above, we prefer to work with a continu-
ous time differential equation if possible. To facilitate this endeavor we will redefine every
incentive function to have a simple time dependence. That is
ϕ˜(x) := tϕ(x).
However, any change to the incentive function must also have an effect on the revision
protocol, thus we write
x′i = Ti(x, t) :=
xi +
∑
α ϕ˜iα(x)eiα
1 +
∑
β ϕ˜iβ(x)
=
xi + t
∑
α ϕiα(x)eiα
1 + t
∑
β ϕiβ(x)
.
Furthermore, it is now possible to define the time derivative of xi.
x˙i := lim
t→0
x′i − xi
t
= lim
t→0
xi + t
∑
α ϕiα(x)eiα − xi − txi
∑
β ϕiβ(x)
t+ t2
∑
β ϕiβ(x)
= lim
t→0
∑
α ϕiα(x)eiα − xi
∑
β ϕiβ(x)
1 + t
∑
β ϕiβ(x)
=
∑
α
ϕiα(x)eiα − xi
∑
β
ϕiβ(x)
In individual coordinates we can write our family of differential equations as
x˙iα = ϕiα − xiα
∑
β
ϕiβ(x).
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We will refer to this family of equations as incentive dynamics.
It should be clear that fixed points of this family of differential equations are exactly
incentive equilibria. As a consequence we have a number of incentive dynamics we can
already describe rather easily. First we note that if we allow the incentive to be given as
Nash originally conceived, ϕ(x) = ϕN(x), then we recover the BNN equations as one would
naturally expect.
We note that in the special case when
∑
β ϕiβ(x) = 0 for every x ∈ ∆, the incentive
dynamics reduce to simply x˙iα = ϕiα(x). The n-population replicator equations are given
by
ϕRiα(x) = xiα(ui(eα, x−i)− ui(x))
simply by recognizing that this incentive fits this special case. We have previously noted that
there are many incentives that have the same equilibria as the replicator incentive above.
These were given by ϕRiα(x) = xiα(ui(eα, x−i) + gi(x)) where g(x) is an arbitrary function
from ∆ to Rn. We derive the replicator equations as follows
x˙iα = ϕ
R
iα(x)− xiα
∑
β
ϕRiβ(x)
= xiα(ui(eα, x−i) + gi(x))− xiα
∑
β
xiβ(ui(eβ, x−i) + gi(x))
= xiαui(eα, x−i) + xiαgi(x)− xiα
∑
β
xiβui(eβ, x−i)− xiα
∑
β
xiβgi(x)
= xiαui(eα, x−i) + xiαgi(x)− xiαgi(x)− xiαui(x)
= xiα(ui(eα, x−i)− ui(x))
Furthermore, we can recover all possible mean dynamics by defining the incentive
ϕMi (x) =
∑
j∈S
xjρji(u(x), x).
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The probability of switching from strategy i to j is given by ρij(u(x), x)/R, where R is
constant. Thus
∑
j∈S ρij(u(x), x) = R for any i. Hence ϕ
M(x) induces the mean dynamics
as follows,
x˙i = ϕ
M
i (x)− xi
∑
j∈S
ϕMj (x)
=
∑
j∈S
xjρji(u(x), x)− xi
∑
j∈S
∑
i∈S
xiρij(u(x), x)
=
∑
j∈S
xjρji(u(x), x)− xi
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈S
xiρij(u(x), x)
=
∑
j∈S
xjρji(u(x), x)− xi
∑
i∈S
xi
∑
j∈S
ρij(u(x), x)
=
∑
j∈S
xjρji(u(x), x)− xi
∑
j∈S
ρij(u(x), x).
3.2 Generality
It has been mentioned that there are other dynamical system models for game play. We
would then like to know if the model presented here is in fact fully general in the sense
that we can achieve all possible game dynamics with an appropriate choice of incentive. In
general a game dynamic will have the form
x˙iα = Fiα(x)
where we require Fiα(x) to preserve the simplex. Therefore, we must have
∑
α Fiα(x) = 0
for every x ∈ ∆ and i ∈ N . Also, we must have Fiα(x) ≥ 0 if xiα = 0. These conditions
make F (x) an incentive function by our definition and our incentive dynamics are exactly
x˙iα = Fiα(x). Therefore, we can recover any valid game dynamic by an appropriate choice
of incentive. As noted above, the incentives that generate a specific dynamic need not be
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unique.
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Chapter 4
Asymptotic Stability and Incentive
Stable States
4.1 Information Theory and The Replicator
Dynamics
Information theory was originally developed by Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver [Sha01,
SW49] as a mathematical framework to describe problems in communication including, but
not limited to, data compression and storage. He introduced measures of information called
entropy1. Shannon’s entropy, denoted H(P ), is a measure of the average uncertainty in a
random variable, P . It can be interpreted as the average number of bits needed to encode a
message drawn i.i.d. from P. Maximizing the entropy can be used to give a lower bound on
this average number of bits needed for encryption.
For our purposes, the concepts of cross entropy and relative entropy will be of great
use. The Kullback-Leibler (KL divergence or DKL) divergence [KL51] or relative entropy
is a measure of information gain (loss) from one state to another. More precisely, it is an
average measure of the additional bits needed to store y given a code optimized to store x.
1In fact, the Shannon entropy is simply the Boltzmann entropy [Jay65] without the constants
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It is defined as
DKL(x||y) =
∑
α
xα ln
xα
yα
=
∑
α
xα lnxα −
∑
α
xα ln yα
= H(x)−H(x, y).
where H(x, y) is the cross entropy of x and y. It should be clear that minimizing DKL with
respect to y is equivalent to minimizing the cross entropy term as well. Intuitively, this is
trying to find the best distribution to approximate the ‘true’ distribution x and is well known
as the Principle of Minimum Discrimination or Minimum Discrimination Information.
Recall the definition of an evolutionary stable state or ESS [S+74].
Definition 4.1. A strategy profile xˆ ∈ ∆ is an ESS if and only if u(xˆ, x) > u(x, x) for every
x 6= xˆ in a neighborhood of xˆ.
In this context there is a single population playing a symmetric game against itself. It
has been shown by Harper [Har11] that the KL divergence is a Lyapunov function for the
replicator equation at an ESS2. This is equivalent to the Principle of Minimum Discrim-
ination. Further connection between evolutionary games and information theory can be
realized by expanding the KL divergence in a Taylor series along x = y and noting that the
Hessian term is positive definite and is thus a metric. The derived metric, a localization of
the global divergence, is called the Shahshahani metric [Sha79] and it has been shown that
the replicator dynamics are gradient flows of this metric [HS98].
2This result continues to be true for n-population games.
26
4.2 Incentive Stable States
The deep connections between information theory and the replicator dynamics lead us to
believe that some of these properties are more general. Unfortunately, most of our incentives
are not gradient flows of some Riemannian metric, but the Principle of Minimum Discrim-
ination is compelling enough for us to believe we may be able to describe asymptotically
stable states for the incentive dynamics. We begin by defining a notion of incentive stability
that is closely related to the notion of ESS.
Definition 4.2. A strategy profile xˆ is an incentive stable state or ISS if and only if
xi · ϕi(x)
xi
< xˆi · ϕi(x)
xi
, ∀i
for x 6= xˆ in a neighborhood of xˆ.
The interpretation is exactly the same as in the ESS case: xˆ is preferred to all distributions
sufficiently close.
We can now show that all ISS are asymptotically stable for the corresponding incentive
dynamics. Note: if there is only one agent we have a necessary and sufficient condition for
the Kullback-Liebler divergence to be a strict Lyapunov function.
Theorem 4.1. If the state xˆ is an interior incentive stable state for the corresponding
incentive dynamics, then
∑
iDKL(xˆi||xi) is a local Lyapunov function.
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Proof. Define Vi(x) = DKL(xˆi||xi) and V (x) =
∑
i Vi(x). Then we have the following:
V˙i(x) = −
∑
α
xˆiα
x˙iα
xiα
= −
∑
α
xˆiα
xiα
[
ϕiα(x)− xiα
∑
β
ϕiβ(x)
]
=
∑
β
ϕiβ(x)
∑
α
xˆiα −
∑
α
xˆiα
xiα
ϕiα(x)
=
∑
α
xiα − xˆiα
xiα
ϕiα(x) < 0
⇔ xi · ϕi(x)
xi
< xˆi · ϕi(x)
xi
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Chapter 5
The Uniform Distribution
We recall incentive dynamics are given by
x˙iα = ϕiα(x)− xiα
∑
β
ϕiβ(x)
where ϕ(x) is the incentive for the game. We have proved that if the incentive for a finite
game is continuous, there exists a fixed point characterized by
ϕiα(xˆ) = xˆiα
∑
β
ϕiβ(xˆ) ∀α, i.
Notice that if this occurs at the uniform distribution, either ϕiα(xˆ) are all zero, or they are
all the same for each agent.
Nash’s original incentive function is fixed if and only if all the component incentives are
zero and thus it can only be in the first case described above. In contrast, the incentive
function given by ϕDiα(x) =
∑
γ(aαγ − ui(x))+ is only zero when ui(x) ≥ maxγ ui(eα, eγ),
where eγ ∈ S−i which can occur at the uniform distribution only if the game is constant,
which is a degenerate case of little interest. Despite their differences we will demonstrate that
the two can agree under certain circumstances. Also, we will see that the latter incentive is
globally asymptotically stable at a uniform Nash equilibrium where the canonical dynamics
fail to converge.
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5.0.1 A Bad Game of Rock-Paper-Scissors
The standard game of Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) is given as a two person zero sum game
with payoffs given in the table below on the left.
0, 0 −1, 1 1, −1
1, −1 0, 0 −1, 1
−1, 1 1, −1 0, 0
0, 0 −b, a a, −b
a, −b 0, 0 −b, a
−b, a a, −b 0, 0
To the right of the RPS payoffs we have a generalized RPS with a and b both positive.
The case when b > a, or an agent can lose more than it can win, is an important example
of a game. The unique Nash equilibrium for this game is the uniform distribution. We
have seen many examples of incentive dynamics that have Nash equilibrium as their interior
fixed points, such as the replicator equations, projection dynamics, the logit equations, best
reply dynamics, and the Brown-von Neumann-Nash equations. However, in every one of
these cases the dynamics do not converge to the unique equilibrium as shown in the figures
below1. This leads us to the natural question: does any incentive dynamic converge to a
rest point from any initial point?
5.1 Agreement Among Incentives
We note the incentive ϕDiα(x) =
∑
γ(aαγ − ui(x))+ can be rewritten in the form ϕDiα(x) =∑
γ(ui(eα, x−i)−ui(x)+aαγ−ui(eα, x−i))+, which shows that it is similar to a Nash compar-
ison in that we are checking the payoff given the other agents’ strategies are fixed. However,
we are tempering that comparison by taking away the amount by which the agent is not
receiving a preferred payoff available in the game. We will now show there is a class of
games, which includes general RPS, with the property that the uniform distribution is a
1The images were produced using the Dynamo Mathematica package developed by Sandholm, Dokumaci,
and Franchetti [SDF11]. Colors indicate speed: blue is slowest and red is fastest
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Nash equilibrium as well as an incentive equilibrium for ϕD(x). First we will need the
following lemma.
Lemma 5.1. If Ai is the payoff matrix for the ith agent, then xˆ is a Nash equilibrium where
each agent is using the uniform distribution over its strategies if and only if for each i, Ai
has an equal sum across rows.
Proof. We begin by noting that for an interior Nash equilibrium we must have
ui(e1, x−i) = . . . = ui(esi , x−i), ∀i.
It should suffice then to calculate the value of just one of the ui(eα, x−i). We will use the
n-linearity of the payoffs to complete the task.
u1(e1, x−1) =
s2∑
j2=1
1
s2
u1(e1, ej2 , x3, . . . , xn) (5.1)
=
1
s2
s2∑
j2=1
u1(e1, ej2 , x3, . . . , xn) (5.2)
=
1
s2
1
s3
s2∑
j2=1
s3∑
j3=1
u1(e1, ej2 , ej3 , x4, . . . , xn) (5.3)
= . . . =
1∏
i∈N/{1} si
s2∑
j2=1
s3∑
j3=1
· · ·
sn∑
jn=1
u1(e1, ej2 , ej3 , . . . , ejn) (5.4)
=
s1
|S|
∑
β
u1(e1, e−1β) (5.5)
which is exactly the average of the coefficients in the first row of A1. Thus for any agent i
we have the equalities
si
|S|
∑
β
ui(e1, e−iβ) =
si
|S|
∑
β
ui(e2, e−iβ) = . . . =
si
|S|
∑
β
ui(esi , e−iβ)
which after cancellation of the non-zero term si|S| proves our assertion.
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Proposition 5.2. If uniform distribution, xˆ ∈ ∆, is a Nash equilibrium and in each of the
payoff matrices the sums of the elements in each row that are larger than the average are
equal, then it is an incentive equilibrium for ϕD(x).
Proof. We will use the above lemma to prove the assertion. Given that the rows must all
have an equal sum, the average of the elements in Ai, which we will denote a¯i, is equal
to si|S|
∑
β ai1β. Let us now consider the condition for an incentive equilibrium when our
incentive is given by ϕD(x). At a Nash equilibrium we have the following calculation for
each agent i
ϕDiα(xˆ) =
∑
γ
(ui(eiα, xˆ−i)− ui(xˆ) + aαγ − ui(eiα, xˆ−i))+ (5.6)
=
∑
γ
(aαγ − ui(eiα, xˆ−i))+ (5.7)
=
∑
γ
(
aαγ − si|S|
∑
β
ui(eiα, e−iβ)
)
+
(5.8)
=
∑
γ
(aαγ − a¯i)+ (5.9)
where the second line is justified since xˆ is a Nash equilibrium and thus ui(eiα, xˆ−i) = ui(xˆ).
The last line is simply the sum of all the elements from row α that are larger than the
average. Given our assumption, it must be the case that ϕDiα(xˆ) = ϕ
D
iβ(xˆ) for every α and β.
Thus we have ϕDiα(xˆ) =
1
si
∑
β ϕ
D
iβ(xˆ) for every agent i, which is true if and only if xˆ is an
incentive equilibrium.
To summarize, we found a class of games where the Nash equilibrium coincides with
the incentive equilibrium for ϕD(x) at the uniform distribution. All RPS games have the
property that the rows of the payoff matrices are permutations of the first row. Games
with this property form a subset of the games where the Nash equilibrium and our incentive
equilibrium agree.
We conjecture that this is the only agreement outside of constant games and strategies
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where players are receiving their respective maximum payoff. There are simple counterex-
amples when either of the conditions is dropped. For example, if Ai =

1 0 0
0 1 0
0 −3 1
,
the average is 0, but the sums across rows are not equal. The interior Nash equilibrium is
xˆ = ((1/6, 1/6, 2/3), (1/6, 1/6, 2/3)) while the incentive equilibrium for ϕD is the uniform
distribution. On the other hand, if Ai =
 1 2
3 0
 then the Nash equilibrium is the uniform
distribution, but the incentive equilibrium is xˆ ≈ ((0.31, 0.69), (0.31, 0.69)).
5.2 Asymptotic Stability
As we have seen, many of the dynamics that have Nash equilibria as fixed points do not
necessarily converge to the uniform distribution. The specific examples that do (at least so
far) have been Rock-Paper-Scissors type games. We notice that the main idea is to create
a cycle of best replies by permuting the values in the first row of the payoff matrix. This
cyclic behavior is essentially the problem with convergence. We will now show that changing
the parameters while maintaining this type of cyclic payoff structure has no impact on the
asymptotic stability of the incentive equilibrium for ϕD(x).
Proposition 5.3. If the rows of the payoff matrix Ai are permutations of each other,
ϕDiα(x) = ϕ
D
iβ(x) for all x ∈ ∆ and either ϕDiα(xˆ) = 0 or xˆiα = 1si for every α at incen-
tive equilibrium.
Proof. Denote σ as the permutation that takes row α to row β; then every element in row
β can be written as aiβγ = aiασ(k) for some k ∈ Si. Thus ϕDiβ =
∑
γ(aiβγ − ui(x))+ =∑
k(aiασ(k) − ui(x))+ = ϕDiα(x) regardless of x.
We can now use this fact to describe all possible incentive equilibria for ϕD(x). By
definition, at equilibrium xˆ, ϕDiα(xˆ) = xˆiα
∑
β ϕ
D
iβ(xˆ) for every i and every α. Given that the
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incentive functions are all equal regardless of x ∈ ∆, we must have ϕDiα(xˆ) = xˆiαsiϕDiα(xˆ),
which is true if and only if ϕDiα(xˆ) = 0 for all α, which can occur only at the boundary or in
a degenerate game, or when xˆiα =
1
si
for every α.
Recall the definition of an ISS is
xˆi · ϕ
D
i (x)
xi
> xi · ϕ
D
i (x)
xi
for all x 6= xˆ in some neighborhood of xˆ. Also, an ISS is asymptotically stable wherever
it satisfies the inequality in the definition. It will suffice then to prove that the uniform
distribution is an ISS and the entire space is its basin of attraction.
Theorem 5.4. If xˆ is a uniform incentive equilibrium for ϕD(x) and the payoff matrices
have rows that are permutations of each other, then xˆ is globally asymptotically stable in
int∆ for the incentive dynamics.
Proof. The previous proposition gives us that the incentives are equal for all α so we can
without loss of generality use only ϕDi1(x) for each i.
0 > − 1
si
∑
α
ϕDiα(x)
xiα
+
∑
β
ϕDiβ(x)
= −ϕ
D
i1(x)
si
∑
α
1
xiα
+ siϕ
D
i1(x)
=
ϕDi1(x)
si
[
s2i −
∑
α
1
xiα
]
If we define f(x) =
∑
α
1
xiα
it is easy to show that f(x) has a global minimum of s2i when
xi is the uniform distribution. We simply optimize using Lagrange multipliers, noting that
the Hessian matrix of f(x) is positive definite in the interior of ∆. Thus xˆ satisfies the ISS
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definition for all x ∈ int∆.
We further conjecture that all interior incentive equilibrium are asymptotically stable. If
this is true we can reduce the open problem of finding a game dynamic where every orbit
converges to a rest point to proving that the basins of attraction for the incentive equilibrium
form a partition of ∆.
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(a) BNN (b) Logit (0.2)
(c) Smith
Figure 5.1: Stable limit cycles in Bad RPS
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(a) standard RPS (b) bad RPS
Figure 5.2: The replicator dynamics display invariant limit cycles and unstable equilibrium
points in the RPS
(a) standard RPS (b) bad RPS
Figure 5.3: The projection dynamics display invariant limit cycles and unstable equilibrium
points in the RPS
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(a) bad RPS (b) RPS
(c) good RPS
Figure 5.4: Global asymptotic stability of the uniform distribution in the simultaneous
updating dynamics
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Chapter 6
Numerical Results
Most of the incentives defined so far are closely related to the Nash equilibrium, which has
been well studied. We would like to present some numerical results for the incentive based
on simultaneous updating,
ϕDiα(x) =
∑
γ
(aiαγ − ui(x))+.
Two player games are by far the most researched in game theory and as such are the best
place to start the discussion. We make the assumption that both players will be making
decisions based on the incentive ϕD(x). Whenever possible experimental data will be given
alongside our numerical approximations of behavior. Illustrations1 of the game dynamics
are given whenever possible. Colors indicate speed: blue is slowest and red is fastest.
To calculate the equilibrium we will use several consequences of the definition for incentive
equilibrium. First we note that if xˆiα = 0, then the definition can only be satisfied if
ϕiα(x) = 0 as well. This can only occur for ϕ
D
iα(x) if and only if the equilibrium utility
ui(xˆ) ≥ max
γ
ui(eiα, e−i,γ).
Consequently, if xˆ ∈ S, then ui(xˆ) must be the maximum possible payoff for each agent i.
Given these strict conditions for pure strategy equilibrium, we expect most games will have
an equilibrium point in the interior of ∆. If this is the case, the incentive equilibrium can
1All diagrams have been produced with Sandholm, Dokumaci, and Franchetti’s Dynamo Mathematica
package [SDF11]
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be classified by the following system of equations:
∑
β
ϕiβ(xˆ) =
ϕi1(xˆ)
xˆi1
=
ϕi2(xˆ)
xˆi2
= · · · = ϕisi(xˆ)
xˆisi
.
Given our proposition on symmetric games given in chapter 2, we can further simplify
calculations by finding the incentive equilibrium guaranteed in the closed convex subset of
∆ given by the symmetry. For example, many of our games will have the form u1(x1, x2) =
u2(x2, x1), where along U = {x|x1 = x2}, ϕD11(x) = ϕD21(x). Thus an equilibrium exists in U
and we have reduced our calculation to just player 1.
6.0.1 Human Behavior
One of the main criticisms of the Nash equilibrium is the general lack of adherence amongst
agents to the equilibrium in game play by humans [GR72, RC65, TS04]. We will show many
examples of this below with specific games. Specifically, we will see a number of examples
where the Nash equilibrium is not only unique but also consists of only pure strategies. This
is a very strong prediction as it can be interpreted as all rational actors must choose the
prescribed pure strategy one hundred percent of the time. In practice this is somewhat, and
not surprisingly, false. It is most commonly described as irrational behavior by agents.
Then there are the dilemmas; see Prisoner’s Dilemma and Traveler’s Dilemma below,
where the equilibrium point itself seems to be questionable given what some might refer
to as common sense. The Traveler’s Dilemma is particularly distressing as the equilibrium
point seems to be diametrically opposed to the intuitive selection of choices for the game.
In fact, in experiments [Bas94, Bas07, CCG07] very few, if any, agents played their Nash
equilibrium strategy. Despite being a simpler game, the Prisoner’s Dilemma has similar, but
less severe, observed behavior. Even in trials with experts playing the game once against
each other, nearly one third played the strictly dominated strategy in the game.
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Cardinal vs. Ordinal Dependence
The term ordinal dependence is used to describe the situation where agents are only con-
cerned with the ranking of payoffs rather than absolute differences in utility. Applying a
monotone increasing function to utilities does not affect ranking and it can be easily shown
that it also does not affect the location of pure strategy Nash equilibra2. Thus any game
with a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium will have the same game play as any other
game that can be obtained by an application of a monotone increasing function. Two such
examples are the Dilemmas discussed above. However, in practice human actors in trials
have shown a strong tendency towards cardinal dependence [GR72, CCG07]. If absolute
differences are important as well as ranking then we expect the only way to achieve identical
behavior after modifying a game is by a simple translation.
6.1 2x2 Games
6.1.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma
The much studied Prisoner’s Dilemma
Confess Not Confess
Confess P , P T , S
Not Confess S , T R , R
where T > R > P > S is given here in its ordinal form. R is the reward for cooperation
if both prisoners choose not to confess to some crime, T is the temptation to confess, S is
the sucker’s payoff for the agent that does not confess when the other does, and P is the
punishment for mutual confession. Notice that with this ordering, confessing is a strictly
dominating strategy for both the row and column players. Thus the Nash equilibrium is
2Nash equilibria that contain mixed strategies can be affected by the application of a monotone increasing
function.
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always (confess, confess) or ((1, 0), (1, 0)) where the first coordinate is the probability of
confessing. Suppose we use S = 1, P = 2, R = 3, and T = 4 to represent the ordinal
game. Then we have below the phase diagrams for the simultaneous updating and BNN.
The point that appears to be asymptotically stable in the simultaneous updating portrait is
x = ((1/
√
2, 1−1/√2), (1/√2, 1−1/√2)) ≈ ((.70, .30), (.70, .30)) which is easily computable
with the assumptions that 2 < ui(x) < 3 and x1 = x2.
However, as we mentioned, the incentive equilibrium will have a strong dependence on
the actual payoffs. If we change the temptation payoff to T = 10 for example the equilibrium
point is
x11 =
1
18
(
8− 44
(917 + 9
√
11433)1/3
+ (917 + 9
√
11433)1/3
)
≈ 0.932
which is closer to the Nash equilibrium for the game, which does not change.
-Prisoner’s Dilemma
To further illustrate the strong dependence on actual payoffs we define the -Prisoner’s
Dilemma by the following table for any  > 0.
0, 0 1 + ,−
−, 1 +  1, 1
We first notice that if  = 1 and we translate the payoffs up by 2 we achieve the ordinal
Prisoner’s Dilemma from above. Also, we have the same strict dominance of the second
strategy by the first for any  > 0 and we maintain the same symmetry as above. A simple
calculation gives u1(x) = 1−x11 for all x ∈ U , and if we assume at equilibrium 0 < u1(xˆ) < 1
our equilibrium occurs when
+ xˆ11
xˆ11
=
xˆ11
1− xˆ11 .
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(a) Simultaneous Updating (b) BNN
Figure 6.1: Ordinal Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Figure 6.2: Simultaneous updating for the Prisoner’s Dilemma with T = 10.
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Thus our solution is xˆ11 =
1− +√1 + 6+ 2
4
. A simple analysis of xˆ11 shows that it is a
(strictly) increasing function of  and consequently xˆ11(0) =
1
2
< xˆ11() < 1 = lim→∞ xˆ11().
Thus the equilibrium utility, 0 < u1(xˆ) <
1
2
, satisfies our assumption for all  > 0.
6.1.2 Chicken
The game of Chicken, or Hawk-Dove, is also of interest to game theorists and biologists.
The ordinal payoff matrix is given below with the interpretation that each agent prefers a
win to a tie, a tie to a loss, and a loss to a crash.
Swerve Straight
Swerve Tie , Tie Lose , Win
Straight Win , Lose Crash , Crash
There are 3 Nash equilibria for this game. The two pure strategy equilibria can be described
without committing any numerical values to the possible events. They are x = ((1, 0), (0, 1))
and x = ((0, 1), (1, 0)). There is also a mixed strategy equilibrium which depends on the
actual payoffs. No such pure strategy incentive equilibrium exists as there is no win-win in
the game. We have 3 variations on the ordinal game of chicken.
3, 3 2, 5
5, 2 1, 1
0, 0 7, 2
2, 7 6, 6
0, 0 −1, 1
1,−1 −10,−10
In the first two games the mixed Nash equilibrium is the same, x = ((1/3, 2/3), (1/3, 2/3))
with utility u(x) = 7/3 and u(x) = 14/3. The incentive equilibria is roughly x ≈ ((.24, .76), (.24, .76))
with u(x) ≈ 2.04 and x ≈ ((.58, .42), (.58, .42)) with u(x) ≈ 3.27 respectively. The final game
displays a much wider difference in styles as the Nash equilibrium is x = ((9/10, 1/10), (9/10, 1/10))
with u(x) = −1/10, where the incentive equilibrium is x ≈ ((0.52, 0.48), (0.52, 0.48)) with
u(x) ≈ −2.29.
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(a) Variation 1 (b) Variation 2
(c) Variation 3
Figure 6.3: Variations of Chicken in the simultaneous updating protocol
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(a) Variation 1 (b) Variation 2
(c) Variation 3
Figure 6.4: Variations of Chicken in the BNN
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6.1.3 Matching Pennies
Matching Pennies is a game designed to have cyclic behavior. That is, suppose we have the
payoff matrix below, then the row player wins when it guesses which side of the coin the
column player has facing up. If the column player thinks the row player knows what it has
done, it is in the player’s best interest to switch. But then it is in the row player’s best
interest to switch and processes of switching and following continues ad infinitum.
Heads Tails
Heads 1 , -1 -1 , 1
Tails -1 , 1 1 , -1
Games of this nature are easy to analyze as both the Nash equilibrium and the incentive
equilibrium are the uniform distribution, x = ((1/2, 1/2), (1/2, 1/2)) since the rows of the
agent’s payoff matrices consists of permutations of the first row only.
An Asymmetric Variant of Matching Pennies
This asymmetric version of the Matching Pennies game puts the row player at an advantage.
There are 3 possibilities for row to win in contrast to columns 2 chances.
1,−1 1, 1
−1, 1 1,−1
There are two Nash equilibria in this game at x = ((1, 0), (0, 1)) and x = ((1, 0), (1/2, 1/2))
that are also incentive equilibria for the game. There is an additional incentive equilibrium
located at x = ((2/3, 1/3), (1/2, 1/2)). The main differences are that if x21 = 1 than any
profile with x11 > 1/2 is a Nash equilibrium. Also, note in the figures below that the
BNN has at best stable equilibria, where the simultaneous updating has two asymptotically
stable fixed points. If one restricts to the boundary x11 = 1 then the win-win is not stable.
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The others are asymptotically stable when restricted to the boundary and the interior of ∆
respectively. This behavior is rather competitive and has been observed in human actors
by Guyer and Rapoport [GR72] using other games. However, the conclusion is that the
advantaged player seeks to find a larger margin of victory rather than settle for a tie.
(a) Simultaneous Updating (b) BNN
Figure 6.5: Asymmetric Matching Pennies
6.1.4 Coordination Games
As the name suggests, these games have the property that it is best for agents to choose the
same strategy. They all have the same pure strategy Nash equilibria at x = ((1, 0), (1, 0))
and x = ((0, 1), (0, 1)). Again the mixed strategy equilibrium will depend on the actual
payoffs if it exists.
A, a C, c
B, b D, d
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where A > B, D > C for player 1 and a > c, d > b for player 2. We will present a few of
the more common examples of coordination games.
Battle of the Sexes
This game is supposed to model a couple who prefer to spend time together but have differing
interests. A common way of describing the situation is that strategy 1 is to go to a football
game and strategy 2 is to go to the opera. Row prefers football while column prefers opera.
Opera Football
Opera 2 , 1 0 , 0
Football 0 , 0 1 , 2
The equilibrium points in this game are very similar. The mixed Nash equilibrium is x =
((2/3, 1/3), (1/3, 2/3)) versus x ≈ ((0.76, 0.24), (0.24, 0.76)) for the incentive equilibrium. In
this example we use the symmetry U = {x ∈ ∆|x11 = x22}.
(a) Simultaneous Updating (b) BNN
Figure 6.6: Battle of the Sexes
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Stag Hunt
The Stag Hunt is another coordination game where players have the choice to hunt a deer
and possibly catch it so there is enough food for both or to individually catch a rabbit for
sure.
Stag Hare
Stag 10 , 10 0 , 7
Hare 7 , 0 7 , 7
This game’s dynamics are somewhat trivial for the simultaneous updating. The players
only incentive equilibrium is x = ((1, 0), (1, 0)) which is also Nash. However, there is a mixed
Nash at x = ((7/10, 3/10), (7/10, 3/10)) which would change if the payoffs were altered. The
incentive equilibrium however will not change and will always fix on the win-win with this
type of configuration.
(a) Simultaneous Updating (b) BNN
Figure 6.7: Stag Hunt
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6.1.5 Other Games
Guyer and Rapoport conducted a study of 2×2 games which they summarize in [GR72]. We
will present their findings alongside our incentive equilibrium. Their are 6 classes of games
and several variations for each one. Some of our results are close to the actual frequencies
seen in the study while others are not.
For symmetric games we will only give the first coordinate x11 = p since all other coor-
dinates will depend only on p.
No Conflict
There are 3 variations of the No Conflict games. They are given below.
28, 28 2, 20
20, 2 −10,−10
28, 28 12, 20
20, 12 −10,−10
28, 28 19, 20
20, 19 −10,−10
The games are symmetric and have a win-win. It turns out that in all three cases our
only incentive equilibrium is p = 1 which is also the Nash equilibrium. The experimental
data is p = 0.88, p = 0.91, and p = 0.91 respectively. The agents seemed to play strategy
two more as the possibility of a larger margin of victory increased.
Threat Vulnerable
There are 7 variations given for this type of game.
−1, 20 20, 15
−2, 6 15,−2
8, 20 20, 15
−2, 6 15,−2
14, 20 20, 15
−2, 6 15,−2
8, 20 20, 15
−8,−1 15,−2
8, 20 20, 15
−8, 6 15,−2
8, 20 20, 15
−8, 14 15,−2
8, 20 20, 15
−14, 6 15,−2
Our equilibrium will be given as (x11, x21) = (p, q) since the remaining two components
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depend on these two.
Variation Incentive Equilibrium Observations
1 (0.58, 0.76) (0.86, 0.84)
2 (0.64, 0.89) (0.92, 0.87)
3 (0.73, 1) (0.93, 0.89)
4 (0.64, 0.70) (0.92, 0.81)
5 (0.65, 1) (0.94, 0.87)
6 (0.65, 1) (0.93, 0.88)
7 (0.65, 1) (0.95, 0.86)
As the Nash equilibrium in all of these games is (1, 1) we have done a better job of predicting
the column player but worse for row.
Force Vulnerable
The Force Vulnerable game is essentially an asymmetric Prisoner’s Dilemma. We again have
7 variants all with Nash equilibrium (1, 1).
12, 12 25,−4
−3, 18 18, 25
12, 12 25,−4
−4, 18 18, 25
12, 12 25,−4
−10, 18 18, 25
6, 12 25,−4
−4, 18 9, 25
6, 12 25,−4
−4, 18 18, 25
6, 12 25,−4
−4, 18 24, 25
−3, 12 25,−4
−4, 18 18, 25
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Variation Incentive Equilibrium Observations
1 (1, 0.51) (0.84, 0.85)
2 (1, 0.51) (0.88, 0.82)
3 (1, 0.51) (0.89, 0.82)
4 (1, 0.51) (0.90, 0.84)
5 (0.74, 0.45) (0.84, 0.82)
6 (0.53, 0.35) (0.71, 0.78)
7 (0.68, 0.43) (0.74, 0.79)
2 Equilibria
These games are very similar to the Battle of the Sexes and are in fact coordination games.
There are 5 variations. As with the other coordination games these games have 2 pure
strategy Nash equilibria and one mixed Nash.
10, 19 4,−7
−14, 4 19, 10
10, 19 4,−7
−7, 4 19, 10
10, 19 4,−7
−1, 4 19, 10
5, 19 4,−7
−7, 4 19, 10
17, 19 4,−7
−7, 4 19, 10
Variation Incentive Equilibrium Observations Mixed Nash
1 (0.47, 1) (0.89, 0.92) (3/16, 5/13)
2 (0.42, 1) (0.88, 0.93) (3/16, 15/32)
3 (0.28, 0.83) (0.75, 0.91) (3/16, 15/26)
4 (0.35, 0.89) (0.73, 0.86) (3/16, 5/9)
5 (0.46, 1) (0.90, 0.94) (3/16, 5/13)
Again, we have done better approximating the column player than the row player.
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Leader
Leader games are symmetric games where the players would rather not choose the same
strategy, which is similar to the concept in Chicken. There are two pure strategy Nash
equilibria located at (1, 0) and (0, 1). There is also a mixed strategy equilibrium.
12, 12 15, 32
32, 15 −5,−5
12, 12 15, 21
21, 15 −5,−5
12, 12 15, 16
16, 15 −5,−5
12, 12 15, 21
21, 15 −11,−11
12, 12 15, 21
21, 15 −16,−16
Variation Incentive Equilibrium Observations Mixed Nash
1 0.30 0.68 1/2
2 0.42 0.77 20/29
3 0.54 0.83 5/6
4 0.45 0.77 26/35
5 0.48 0.79 31/40
The mixed strategy Nash is actually better than our approximation in every case.
Hero
Hero games are much like Leader games. The difference is the leader is increasing their own
payoff but increasing the other’s payoff more.
8, 8 16, 14
14, 16 −5,−5
8, 8 24, 14
14, 16 −5,−5
8, 8 30, 14
14, 30 −5,−5
8, 8 24, 22
14, 16 −5,−5
8, 8 24, 9
9, 24 −5,−5
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Variation Incentive Equilibrium Observations Mixed Nash
1 0.59 0.84 7/9
2 0.81 0.83 29/35
3 0.86 0.82 35/41
4 0.55 0.76 29/43
5 0.97 0.91 29/30
Cycle
Cycle games are roughly similar to Matching Pennies in the sense that during repeated
trials there is always incentive to change one’s strategy. There is a single pure strategy Nash
equilibrium at (1, 1) and a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
9, 5 5,−10
26, 9 −10, 26
15, 5 5,−10
26, 9 −10, 26
24, 5 5,−10
26, 9 −10, 26
15, 5 5,−10
26, 16 −10, 26
15, 5 5,−10
26, 24 −10, 26
Variation Incentive Equilibrium Observations Mixed Nash
1 (0.42, 0) (0.69, 0.73) (17/32, 15/32)
2 (0.47, 0) (0.77, 0.76) (17/32, 15/26)
3 (0.52, 0.09) (0.85, 0.79) (17/32, 15/17)
4 (0.40, 0.23) (0.71, 0.83) (2/5, 15/26)
5 (0.30, 0.44) (0.59, 0.87) (2/17, 15/26)
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6.2 3x3 and Larger Games
We have already discussed one class of 3× 3 and larger games when discussing the uniform
distribution. If the rows of the payoff matrix are permutations of the first row then the
uniform distribution is an incentive equilibrium and it is asymptotically stable for the entire
interior of ∆. We will now switch focus to a large game of interest.
6.2.1 Traveler’s Dilemma
The Traveler’s Dilemma is a two agent game with the following rules. Both agents must offer
a price for identical objects obtained on vacation that have been broken while in transit. The
objects are identical, but the person who claims the lower value gets that value plus a reward.
The other player gets the lower bid minus the reward. If they both say the same price, they
both receive that value. The game was originally introduced by Basu [Bas94, Bas07] and
has since been studied by many, including [CCG07, CGGH99, GH99] as well as others. The
dilemma is that the Nash equilibrium for this game is always the minimum possible bid for
the item. Basu’s original formulation had this minimum at 2 with a reward/punishment of
r = 2. Others have noted in their experiments that increasing r will increase the likelihood
of agents playing Nash strategy. However, for lower r, like that found in Basu’s study, the
Nash strategy is virtually if not entirely non-existent in actual game play.
Bid 2 3 4
2 2 , 2 4 , 0 4 , 0
3 0 , 4 3 , 3 5 , 1
4 0 , 4 1 , 5 4 , 4
For the 3 × 3 version of the Traveler’s Dilemma above the incentive equilibrium is very
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easy to compute. In fact, if we assume 2 < u < 3, our calculation becomes
2(4− u)
x11
=
5− u+ 3− u
x12
=
4− u
x13
which clearly gives x11 = x12 = 2x13. The simplex constraint is enough to finish the calcu-
lation giving x = ((2/5, 2/5, 1/5), (2/5, 2/5, 1/5)) with a payoff of u(x) = 2.4.
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(a) Simultaneous Updating (b) BNN
(c) Replicator (d) Projection
Figure 6.8: 3× 3 Traveler’s Dilemma
58
(a) Best Response (b) Smith
(c) logit µ = 0.2
Figure 6.9: 3× 3 Traveler’s Dilemma
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